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 Chapter 5 
 The Dynamics of Opportunity in America: 
A Working Framework 
 Henry  Braun 
 Abstract  Since its founding, America has been seen as a land of opportunity, 
where an individual with skills who was willing to work hard could achieve success 
and expect his children to do even better. Today we live in turbulent times: A tsu-
nami of change is washing over us, driven by forces operating at multiple levels that 
have not only led to almost unprecedented inequalities in income and wealth, but 
also have dramatically restructured the economy and changed the landscape of 
work. Having suffi cient amounts of relevant human and social capital are more criti-
cal than ever—and too many Americans are fi nding they are not equipped to suc-
ceed as workers and citizens. Growing inequities in access to opportunities to 
develop needed capital, strongly linked to socioeconomic status should be cause for 
grave concern. This chapter presents a framework—gates, gaps, and gradients—that 
can facilitate understanding of both the dynamics governing the distribution of 
access to opportunity across the developmental lifespan and the implications of 
those dynamics for intragenerational and intergenerational mobility. Further, it indi-
cates in broad strokes how this nation can begin to broaden opportunity in order to 
revitalize the American Dream for the twenty-fi rst century. 
 Keywords  Opportunity •  Globalization •  Technology •  Human capital •  Wages • 
 Educational attainment •  Skills •  Intergenerational mobility •  Socioeconomic status 
(SES) •  Unmarried mothers •  Unemployment 
 Introduction 
 We live in turbulent times—economically, technologically, socially, and politically. 
A tsunami of change is washing over us, driven by forces operating at all levels: 
global, national, regional, and local. Some of these forces, such as  globalization and 
 technology , are supranational. Some, such as  fi scal and trade policy , are decided at 
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the national level. Others, such as education and health policies, are the result of a 
combination of national and state actions. Yet others, such as changes in the 
demographics of neighborhoods, are infl uenced by forces at all levels, such as inter-
national migration patterns, as well as by local laws and regulations adopted to 
achieve certain policy objectives or to accommodate the interests of various 
stakeholders. 
 Even prior to the  Great Recession , stable employment and guaranteed  retirement 
were pledged to fewer and fewer workers. Today, the nation is experiencing not only 
ongoing “creative destruction” of fi rms (and of jobs within fi rms) but also threats to 
both public and private pensions. Correspondingly, increasing numbers of individu-
als are either “under water” or confronting that prospect. Although some are able to 
ride the wave and prosper, they, too, face greater uncertainties. Indeed, for almost 
everyone, this is the  Age of Anxiety . 
 That justifi able anxiety is, in part, a consequence of increasing inequality in both 
income and wealth driven by trends in labor and capital markets, as well as by dif-
ferences in opportunities to accumulate relevant  human capital . Arguably, today’s 
differences will lead to even greater divergence in opportunities in the future. The 
implications of such a self-reinforcing, multigenerational cycle—for the economy, 
for society, and for our democratic polity—are a matter of current debate. 1 I believe 
that such a prospect is one we cannot afford to ignore. As Nobel Laureate  Joseph 
Stiglitz argues, “An economic and political system that does not deliver for most 
citizens is one that is not sustainable in the long run. Eventually, faith in democracy 
and the market economy will erode, and the legitimacy of existing institutions and 
arrangements will be called into question. 2 
 This is certainly not the fi rst time in our country’s history that we face great dif-
fi culties. In the past, however, there were two beliefs, held by many, that helped to 
sustain and inspire us to meet the challenges. The fi rst was  American exceptional-
ism —America was unlike (and better than) other countries, truly a light unto the 
nations. The second was that the U.S. was a land of unprecedented  opportunity —no 
matter their circumstances at birth, individuals could realistically expect to improve 
themselves through education, hard work, and persistence, and more importantly, 
their children could aspire to do even better. 
 These beliefs are harder to maintain today. World events have shaken our 
belief in American exceptionalism, and reams of statistics—not to mention the 
experiences of tens of millions of individuals—cast doubt on meaningful oppor-
tunity in America being available to all. Indeed, surveys show that many older 
persons, especially parents, believe that the next generation will not do as well 
1  Stiglitz  2012 ; Cowen  2013 . 
2  Joseph Stiglitz, “Climate Change and Poverty Have Not Gone Away,”  Guardian , January 7, 2013, 
 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jan/07/climate-change-poverty-inequality . 
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as they have—and even fewer adults consider themselves members of the mid-
dle class. 3 
 Historically, differences in opportunity were associated with race and, indeed, 
this was the prime motivation for the Great Society legislation pursued by President 
Lyndon Johnson in the mid-1960s. Although differences by race and ethnicity per-
sist and remain substantial, there is considerable evidence that differences (say, in 
test scores) by income are now larger than those by race. Moreover, differences by 
 income within a  race/ethnicity category are also quite striking (Reardon  2011 ; 
Murray  2012 ). As will be demonstrated in what follows, individual differences in 
opportunity result in differences in individuals’ levels of preparedness to success-
fully meet the demands of adult life—as workers, citizens and, for most, parents. 
That level of preparedness is often signifi ed by the term  human capital . This chapter 
focuses on human capital: what it is, how it develops and is accumulated, what is 
happening to its distribution across the U.S. population, and some possible conse-
quences if current trends continue. 
 Before diving in, let’s look at some data to give us a sense of the state of inequal-
ity in America. Following the old adage that a picture is worth a thousand words, we 
begin with some graphs. Figure  5.1 shows the percentile trajectories for wages and 
salaries from 1961 to 2000. For about 30 years after World War II, the relationships 
among the trajectories remained fairly stable, that is, greater prosperity was gener-
ally shared. After 1975, and certainly after 1980, the income trajectories began to 
diverge, quite dramatically. What is especially noteworthy is how the top percentiles 
3  Leslie McCall, “Political and Policy Responses to Problems of Inequality: Past, Present and 






































’70’65 ’75 ’80 ’85 ’90 ’95 ’00
–10%
Year
 Fig. 5.1  Distribution of real wage and salary earnings for full-year, full-time males workers aged 
18–64 as compared to 1961–2000 (Used by permission of The Aspen Institute) 
 











































 Fig. 5.2  Distribution of real wage and salary earnings for full-year, full-time male workers aged 
16 and over, as compared to 2000 (Source: Author’s tabulations of the Current Population Survey) 
have pulled away from the rest—a striking manifestation of increasing inequality. 4 
Figure  5.2 presents an analogous picture but employs 2000 as a new starting point. 
Clearly the divergence in earnings between the higher and lower percentiles has 
continued through 2014. Putting the two fi gures together yields a disturbing picture 
of increasing inequality.
 Figure  5.3 , which offers a more focused view of this phenomenon, displays the 
cumulative change (1979–2010) in real annual wages by income group, defi ned by 
percentiles of the income distribution. 5 Evidently, the increases garnered by the top 
1 % dwarf those in the 95th—99th and the 90th—95th percent categories. But these 
are still more than double the 15 % gain of the rest (the “bottom” 90 %) (Thompson 
 2012 ). The divergence is even more striking for changes in total annual household 
income (i.e., including both capital gains and income transfers)—and more striking 
still if one considers household wealth or shares of the stock market (Piketty  2014 ; 
for a quicker look, see Thompson  2012 ). 6 At the same time, some economists argue 
4  Tabulations by Professor David Ellwood, Harvard University. 
5  Economic Policy Institute (State of Working America). It is important to understand that this 
graph does not follow specifi c people over time but, rather, is constructed anew each year. Thus, it 
doesn’t tell us anything about the (relative) income mobility or immobility of particular 
individuals. 
6  Data from the Congressional Budget Offi ce shows that the cumulative growth in average after-tax 
income (sum of market income and government transfers minus federal tax liabilities) did not vary 




that focusing on the trajectory of the “1 %” is misguided, at least with respect to 
addressing the broader issues of inequality (Mankiw  2013 ). 7 
 Figure  5.4 displays the 50-year trajectories of real  wages for different levels of 
 educational attainment , separately for men and women (Autor  2014 ; see also 
Acemoglu and Autor  2012 , Fig. 3). Although there are some differences between 
males and females, in general, individuals with higher levels of attainment have 
done well, while those at the lowest levels have either stagnated (high school 
diploma) or even lost ground (less than a high school diploma). Who are the indi-
viduals in that last category? Table  5.1 offers one answer. It displays the probability 
of individuals lacking a  high school diploma or GED as a function of their family 
income and their  Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) score, a 
composite measure of developed skills. 8 More than 35 % of individuals coming 
from poor families with ASVAB scores in the lowest quintile fall in this category of 
attainment, with the percentages falling with increasing family income and dramati-
cally so with higher ASVAB scores.
7  Tyler Cowen,“ It’s Not the Inequality; It’s the Immobility.”  New York Times, April 5, 2015, 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/upshot/its-not-the-inequality-its-the-immobility.html?
abt=0002&abg=1 . 
8  Data compiled by the Center for Labor Market Studies, Northeastern University. For more infor-
mation see  http://offi cial-asvab.com/index.htm . 
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 Fig. 5.3  Cumulative change in real annual wages, by wage group, 1979–2010 (Economic Policy 
Institute, 2012, “Cumulative Change in Real Annual Wages, by Wage Group, 1979–2010”, The 
State of Working America, Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, Aug. 22, 2012,  www.
stateofworkingamerica.org/jobs/fi gure4H ) 
 











Real weekly earnings relative to 1963 (men)













’68 ’72 ’76 ’80 ’84 ’88
Year
Year






 Fig. 5.4  Changes in real wage levels of full-time U.S. workers by sex and education, 1963–2012 




 The last graph in this series, Fig.  5.5 , compares the  problem-solving skills of 
American adults (ages 16–65) to those of other developed countries. Comparisons 
are displayed for two age classes. This is also very striking: For the oldest age class 
(55–64), the U.S. is at the top, but for the youngest age class (16–24), the U.S. is at 
the bottom (OECD  2013 , Fig. 3.3).
 What do these pictures tell us? Figures  5.1 ,  5.2 and  5.3 demonstrate that rising 
income inequality is real. Even when government benefi ts are taken into account 
there is still a widening gap between the bottom 50 % and the top 10 %, and even 
more so if attention focuses on the top 1 % or, especially, the top 0.1 %. Figure  5.4 
and Table  5.1 together show that income inequality is strongly related to the amount 
 Table 5.1  Percent of 24- to 28-year-old adults in the U.S. in 2008 without a high school diploma 
or GED by ASVAB test score quintile and family’s income in their teenaged years in 1997 (Andrew 
Sum 2014, presentation to  Opportunity in America panel) 
 Family income 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F) 
 Bottom  Second  Middle  Fourth  Top  All 
 Poor  35.9  15.4  10.6  4.7  0  22.9 
 1–2* poor  30.0  11.1  6.5  2.3  4.3  15.4 
 2–3* poor  19.8  8.4  5.2  1.2  0  6.7 
 3–4* poor  19.0  5.8  7.4  1.2  0  4.0 
 4 or more * poor  16.3  1.7  .6  0  0  2.1 
 All  28.3  8.2  3.7  1.5  .5 
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 Fig. 5.5  Problem-solving profi ciency among younger adults (age 16–24) and older adults (age 
55–65) (OECD  2013 ) 
 Percentage of adults aged 16–24 and 55–65 scoring at level 2 or 3 in problem solving in technology- 
rich environments 
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of education achieved and that those with weak skills and coming from poor  families 
are likely to fall in the lowest category of attainment. 9 It is reasonable to conclude 
that individuals with  low skills are unlikely to earn a good wage while those with 
 high skills have an excellent chance of doing so. In point of fact, there are now mil-
lions of individuals with low skills confronting poor job prospects. 
 Figure  5.5 signals America’s relative decline. Today’s young adults may not be 
less literate than their elders (and may well be more profi cient with technology), but 
other countries have charged ahead so that too many of our young adults are not 
competitive in the global marketplace and, more and more, the global marketplace 
infl uences what happens in towns and cities across America. Unfortunately, the 
problem is not confi ned to the youngest cohort. As Kevin Carey of the New America 
Foundation has pointed out, comparisons of literacy skills among 25 to 29-year-olds 
who are college graduates show that Americans again fall well below the 
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average. 10 Similar fi nd-
ings hold for numeracy skills (see Fig. 8 of Goodman, Sands, and Coley  2015 ). 
 There is a growing consensus that current trends, if left unchecked, pose a seri-
ous threat not only to the American Dream, but to the American way of life (Stiglitz 
 2012 ; Noah  2013 ). If that is the case, we must understand these forces and their 
interactions if we are to have even a possibility of countering their effects. At the 
same time, given the multiplicity of factors and the range of dynamics among them, 
it would be naïve to believe that there is a simple fi x such as to just “improve educa-
tion” or “make the income tax more progressive”; rather, it is surely necessary to 
undertake a broad set of strategies that are systematic, systemic, and sustained. This 
will be neither simple nor easy. 
 The chief purpose of this chapter, undertaken under the auspices of the 
 Opportunity in America project and funded by  Educational Testing Service , is to 
present a framework that can help us to understand both the dynamics governing the 
distribution of access to opportunity in America and the implications of those 
dynamics for intragenerational and intergenerational mobility. It offers some of the 
relevant evidence and constitutes an initial foray into an exceedingly complex and 
controversial topic. The ultimate goal of the project is to contribute to a constructive 
public debate on the implications of increasing inequality and social stratifi cation, 
however measured, and how we can dramatically expand opportunity in order to 
revitalize the American Dream for the 21st century. 
9  It appears that differences in educational attainment better account for differences in income 
below the median than they do above the median – especially differences within the top quintile. 
10  Kevin Carey, “Americans Think We Have the World’s Best Colleges. We Don’t,”  New York 




 What Is Opportunity? 
 Opportunity is defi ned by Merriam-Webster as  a favorable juncture of circum-
stances. For our purposes it can be thought of as the set of paths by which a child’s 
potential develops over time into the broad set of skills, competencies, and disposi-
tions (i.e., the human capital) that will enable him or her to successfully navigate 
adult life. By inequality of opportunity we mean that the paths for some children 
present relatively few obstacles to their developmental trajectories; for others, there 
are many obstacles and, consequently, they are less likely to be able to amass needed 
human capital. 11 
 Not surprisingly, the path a child traverses is strongly related to his or her fami-
ly’s circumstances at birth and the early years that follow. In fact, the data show that 
those children born with substantial advantages are on track to accumulate a great 
deal of  human capital and, consequently, are very unlikely to fall much below their 
beginnings, at least with respect to their relative standing on the income ladder. 12 By 
contrast, those children born into pervasive disadvantage face great diffi culties in 
accumulating human capital and are very unlikely to rise much above their begin-
nings with respect to their relative standing. 13 As one recent study in Baltimore 
argues, an impoverished childhood casts a “long shadow” on adult outcomes 
(Alexander et al.  2014 ). 
 Of course there are anecdotes of children “beating the odds” and achieving great 
success despite an unpromising start. 14 But the data indicate that they are the rare 
exception and not the rule. And we must ask: Do we want America to be a country 
where millions of children must be heroes in order to achieve a modicum of security 
and stability? 
11 Although the focus of this chapter is on the distribution of opportunities to develop human capital 
over the age span of 0–25, there are also differential opportunities in adulthood to productively 
employ that human capital and continue to amass it through one’s lifespan. The former is addressed 
in a later section on gradients. Relevant factors include general skill-labor market fi t, workplace 
discrimination, and secular economic trends. The latter depends on the nature of employment, the 
availability and affordability of venues for education and training, and individual choice. 
12 As one reviewer pointed out, the typical child whose father earns $500,000 at age 40 may, when 
he or she reaches age 40, be earning only $300,000. This would be a manifestation of regression to 
the mean. The child then may have lost ground on absolute mobility but very little on relative 
mobility. 
13  See for example, publications based on The Brookings Institution’s  Social Genome Project 
(Brookings Institution  2013 ). For a more positive outlook on the impact of sustained and system-
atic interventions, see Sawhill and Karpilow  2014 . 
14  There is some empirical evidence that succeeding against the odds takes a physical and psycho-
logical toll that has consequences in later years. See Brody et al. ( 2013 ). 
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 The Challenge 
 Understanding the dynamics underlying current trends and patterns in the distribu-
tion of opportunity across income levels and social strata, as well as increasing 
income inequality and stagnant intergenerational mobility, is critical to formulating 
meaningful policy responses. 15 This is an exceedingly diffi cult task, made more 
challenging because the forces in question have a wide range. They include such 
factors as global macroeconomic trends, the transmission from parents to children 
of advantage (or disadvantage) related to family characteristics and resources, and 
 neighborhood environment . Adding to this challenge is that both inequality and 
 intergenerational mobility have been defi ned in different ways and studied with dif-
ferent populations, sometimes yielding different results (Black and Devereux  2010 ; 
Blanden  2013 ). 
 We also must take into account personal responsibility—the choices that indi-
viduals make along their life path and the consequences of those choices. That is, 
success in accumulating human capital and, subsequently, in the labor market 
depends on not only having opportunities but also taking advantage of them (see 
Chap.  8 ). Finally, the statistical averages that are often cited, whether of cognitive 
skills or income, mask enormous variation by geographical location, race/ethnicity, 
and other factors. This variation must be taken into account not only in understand-
ing inequality but also in formulating policy prescriptions. 
 In order to sort out and make some sense of the wealth of empirical research that 
has been carried out, it is helpful to have a framework that can structure a descrip-
tion of how a child’s potential and family circumstances at birth, interacting over 
time with forces large and small, result in a young adult (say, age 25) who is more 
or less ready to take responsibility for his or her future and lead a life of accomplish-
ment and fulfi llment. 
 The framework we propose is captured by the three-part metaphor of  gates, 
gaps , and  gradients . The next section introduces this framework, which is then used 
to describe some of the factors that contribute to differences in opportunity and the 
resulting variation in accumulated human capital. The fi nal section looks forward to 
some policy actions that could counter current trends. 
 The Framework: Gates/Gaps/Gradients 
 The fi rst element of the framework is  Gates , a metaphor for how opportunity in 
America is increasingly determined by income, wealth, and  socioeconomic status 
(SES) , as well as by race/ethnicity. From birth to, say, age 25, individuals 
15  Intergenerational mobility (IGM) is a measure of the probability that a child with parents at one 
level in society will, as an adult, reside in a different level—higher or lower. The most commonly 
used scales are income, years of education, and socioeconomic status. Economists sometimes use 
the term intergenerational elasticity (IGE), which is the opposite of IGM. 
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accumulate the human capital, broadly conceived, that will play a critical role in 
their adult outcomes. The dimensions of human capital include a variety of  cogni-
tive and  noncognitive skills , as well as dispositions, experiences, and fl exibility (see 
Keeley  2007 ; Pellegrino and Hilton  2012 ). At each stage of development, the gates 
represent access or obstacles to opportunities to add human capital, building on 
whatever potential individuals may have, as well as the human capital they already 
possess. For individuals born in higher strata (by income, SES, or other) the gates 
are mostly open, offering access to a multitude of opportunities. For individuals 
born in lower strata, the gates are mostly closed so that there are fewer opportunities 
to amass essential high-quality human capital at a developmentally appropriate 
stage (Fishkin  2014 ). 
 The use of the term “gates” is motivated by the gated communities that have 
sprung up over the last few decades and are perhaps the most visible aspect of the 
stratifi cation of opportunity. Children born in such privileged communities have 
multiple opportunities to develop their human capital, while those born outside of 
them often have fewer. 
 However, stratifi cation of opportunity goes far beyond these enclaves of privi-
lege. According to some investigators, over the last few decades, residential 
 segregation by income has remained fairly stable and by race/ethnicity has even 
declined slightly. Others argue that residential segregation by income has increased. 
All agree, however, that Blacks and Hispanics remain much more segregated than 
Whites and Asians (Rugh and Massey  2013 ; Bischoff and Reardon  2013 ). 
Neighborhood differences in income are, in turn, strongly associated with differ-
ences in private and public investments in children such as parental attention, school 
quality, the nature and extent of social networks, and so on (Bischoff and Reardon 
 2013 ). These and other factors largely determine which gates are open to some 
children—and closed to others. 
 Indeed, it is worth noting that as neighborhoods become more homogeneous 
with respect to income, so do children’s peer groups (Ibid.). This homogeneity car-
ries over to school—whether a neighborhood public school or a private school 
(parochial or nonsectarian). Increasingly, children fi nd themselves in schools segre-
gated by income as well as by race and ethnicity (Coley and Baker  2013 ). 
 Stratifi cation by income also leads to neighborhoods that are more homogeneous 
with respect to percentages of adults in the labor force or facing long-term unem-
ployment, as well as the types of work engaged in by those who are employed. Such 
patterns are determined in large part by the type and extent of the human capital that 
adults bring to the labor market, as well as labor market trends in the kinds of occu-
pations with openings, the salaries and benefi ts offered, and their locations (Levy 
and Murnane  2013 ). At the low end of the spectrum, neighborhoods in which a 
plurality of adult males either are or have been incarcerated are characterized by 
high unemployment, high levels of crime, and a lack of positive role models. 
 As noted at the outset, these trends are driven not only by globalization and the 
rapid advances in technology but also by interactions among market forces, regula-
tory decisions, and legislation. Inasmuch as how these trends shape parents’ or 
5 The Dynamics of Opportunity in America: A Working Framework
148
guardians’ circumstances, children’s opportunities are indirectly—but powerfully—
affected by both macroeconomic factors and general societal trends. 
 Gaps is a metaphor for the differences among individuals in an age cohort at 
various points in time in the distributions of human capital. The gaps at the start of 
full adulthood are a consequence of the dynamic interactions between gates and 
gaps at each stage of the age span (Sawhill and Karpilow  2014 ). For example, dif-
ferences at birth related to various gates being open, ajar, or fully closed lead to gaps 
as early as they can be measured (see Chap.  8 ). In turn, those gaps interact with the 
gates at age 5 (strongly correlated with those at birth) to produce additional gaps by 
age 14. This process evolves through successive transition points to age 25 and 
beyond. By age 25 there is great variability in the types and magnitudes of human 
capital that have been accumulated—and much of that variability can be traced back 
to individuals’ family circumstances at birth and in their formative years. 
 Gates and Gaps Together 
 It is particularly important to understand how gates and gaps interact over time to 
produce gates and gaps at the next stage. 16 A good example is provided by individu-
als applying to college at the end of high school. Students from poorer families with 
weak grades and low test scores face many closed gates: Not only are top-tier  col-
leges and universities out or reach, but when they enroll at community colleges they 
fi nd that they must take one or more so-called remedial courses, a path that often 
leads to dropping out before obtaining a degree or certifi cate. (Bettinger et al.  2013 ; 
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education Special Report  2010 ). 17 
 Sometimes the gates are less obvious. Students coming from families without 
college experience are less adept at navigating the admissions and  fi nancial aid 
processes and have fewer resources upon which to draw. In fact, a recent study fi nds 
that many able, top-scoring minority students coming from lower SES families 
don’t even apply to top-tier colleges, thinking they don’t qualify and couldn’t afford 
them if they were accepted (Hoxby and Avery  2013 ). This problem stems from the 
lack of a certain kind of  social capital , a lack that is amenable to policy intervention 
(Hoxby and Turner  2014 ). 
 One consequence of this dynamic between gates and gaps is relatively  homoge-
neous  college campuses , leading to assortative mating and further divergence in 
16  The recognition that such dynamic interactions over, say, ages 0–18 can have powerful effects on 
the distribution of adult skills is implicit in Brookings Institution,  Social Genome Project, and 
explicit in the work of  James Heckman and his associates  http://heckmanequation.org/content/
resource/case-investing-disadvantaged-young-children . 
17  The problem of high school graduates going on to tertiary education but required to take one or 
more noncredit-bearing courses (sometimes designated as  remedial or  developmental ) is more 
pervasive than one that just concerns students from low-income families. While some studies esti-
mate 35–40 % of students entering college need at least one remedial course, other studies place 
the estimate as high as 60 %. 
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personal/family trajectories (McClanahan  2014 ). This divergence is even more pro-
nounced when one looks at the full birth cohort, which includes those who dropped 
out of high school or completed high school but did not go on for further education 
or training (see Chap.  7 , Fig.  7.13 ). 
 Gradients i s a metaphor for the strength of the relationships between the dimen-
sions of human capital on the one hand, and various life outcomes on the other.  Life 
outcomes include whether the individual is employed, the nature and remuneration 
(salary and benefi ts) of that employment, the possibility of obtaining further educa-
tion/training, accumulation of wealth, the likelihood of forming stable family units, 
and having children in the context of those partnerships. The data show that the 
gradients are typically quite steep; that is, modest differences in human capital can 
result in substantial differences in outcomes. For example, both the likelihood of 
full-time employment and the likelihood of having children in the context of a two- 
parent family are strongly correlated with levels of  educational attainment and 
 cognitive skills. Gradients are critical because they account for much of the relative 
advantage or disadvantage that is passed on to the next generation. 
 It is worth pointing out that gradients are typically not linear. That is, there are 
infl ection points such that there can be large differences in outcomes for individuals 
who are close in many facets of human capital. For example, individuals with simi-
lar cognitive skills but who differ in whether they obtained a college degree can 
have very different adult trajectories. On the other hand, differences between infl ec-
tion points may be less consequential. 
 In the remainder of the chapter, the gates/gaps/gradients framework will be used 
to organize some of the voluminous literature concerning the forces and processes 
driving differences in opportunity, as well as the extent of those differences. 
 The Dynamics of Inequality 
 The Birth Lottery 
 For a  newborn , whether the gates to different opportunities are open or closed 
depends very much on family structure and income. Of course, these are mutually 
dependent and strongly associated with other relevant factors such as parental edu-
cation, housing, neighborhood characteristics, and school quality. 18 All these factors 
have a direct bearing on the investments, private and public, that are made in 
children. 
 In general, children born to mothers who are single or in unstable relationships 
face more closed gates, and the rates of such births vary substantially by mother’s 
race/ethnicity, age, educational attainment, and location. Although  nonmarital birth 
rates are generally declining for all groups, the proportion of all births to  unmarried 
18  The work of Heckman and his associates is relevant here. For a summary of that work, see 
Heckman,  Case for Investing. 
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mothers is still very high. For example, as of 2012, the proportion of nonmarital 
births overall was 40.7 %. 19 However, the proportions varied considerably by race/
ethnicity: They were 72.6 % for  non-Hispanic Blacks , 54 % for  Hispanics , and 
29 % for  non-Hispanic Whites . As one might expect, there is also considerable 
variation among states in both birth rates and proportions of nonmarital births. 20 
 To introduce further nuance to this picture, it appears that less than 20 % of 
mothers who give birth out of wedlock are truly single; the others are in some form 
of relationship with the father (Wise  2013 ). However, these dyads are quite fragile. 
Follow-up data show that by their fi fth birthday, 61 % of these children have expe-
rienced the dissolution of the relationship between the parents. By contrast, of chil-
dren born to married parents, only 18 % have experienced a dissolution by their fi fth 
birthday. 21 
 Research supports the criticality of the period from birth to age 5. Not only is 
 brain growth greater than at any other postnatal stage, but also the character of the 
early learning environment infl uences patterns of neural growth that in turn are 
related to the capacity to develop human capital (Fox et al.  2010 ). 22 By now there is 
an extensive research base that documents the conditions that strongly predict 
whether or not a child thrives in this critical period (Barton and Coley  2013 ). Some 
of these conditions typically involve monetary investments. They include  pre- and 
postnatal care , good  maternal health , adequate shelter and nutrition, living in a non-
toxic  environment , appropriate  medical and dental care , and  high quality day care 
(when needed). Other conditions involve nonmonetary investments. These include 
establishing a nurturing relationship,  parental attention , socioemotional develop-
ment, as well as cultivation of early  language and numeracy skills . 
 There is an equally extensive research base that demonstrates that the probability 
that a child experiences something close to the ideal increases with income and 
stable family structure. Toward the high end of the income ladder, the gates are 
mostly open and the child is very likely to thrive; that is, grow up healthy and 
secure—arriving at school ready both cognitively and socioemotionally. Toward the 
low end of the ladder, many gates are closed and the child is much less likely to 
19  Birth rates are usually calculated as the number of births per 1,000 women in a particular cate-
gory (e.g., unmarried women aged 15–19). Although nonmarital birth rates have been declining, it 
is still possible for the proportion of nonmarital births overall to be increasing. The explanation is 
that the proportion is a function of both category-specifi c birth rates and the distribution of women 
among the categories. 
20  For example, teen birth rates varied from a low of 13.8 % in New Hampshire to a high of 42.5 % 
in New Mexico; Centers for Disease Control  2013 . For an explanation of the apparent paradox of 
declining birth rates and high proportions of nonmarital births, see Wise  2013 . 
21  Tach’s tabulations from the Fragile Families & Child Wellbeing Surveys, Waves 3–4, quoted in 
Smeeding, “ Connecting Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility: Looking Ahead, Not Behind ” 
(unpublished presentation). 
22  There is also evidence of continuing neuroplasticity into adolescence. An experiment in Chicago 
Public Schools focuses on accelerating the development of the math skills of African-American 
and Latino ninth and 10th graders who are lagging behind their age peers. See David L. Kirp, 
“Closing the Math Gap for Boys,” Sunday Review,  New York Times, January 31, 2015. 
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thrive. Similarly, children who are raised in two- parent families are more likely to 
fi nd the gates open than are children raised in  single-parent families , particularly if 
the mother is younger and not in a committed relationship (Grannis and Sawhill 
 2013 ; Doyle et al.  2009 , 1–6; Heckman and Masterov  2007 ). Whether the gates are 
mostly open or closed is one manifestation of the constellation of conditions that are 
typical of higher incomes and/or two-parent families on the one hand, and of lower 
income and/or single parent families on the other. In both cases, there are powerful 
implications for future development. 
 Adequate  nutrition can serve as a bellwether indicator of a child’s environment. 
Food insecurity is strongly associated with family structure. Using 2011 survey 
data, it was found that female-headed households (no spouse) had a 37 % rate of 
 food insecurity , while married couple households had a 14 % rate (Coley and Baker 
 2013 , Fig. 7); both groups saw increases from 2005). Not surprisingly, the relation-
ship between family income and food insecurity is particularly strong. For families 
with incomes below the poverty level, the rate is 45 %, while for families with 
incomes at least 1.85 times the poverty level, the rate is only 8 %. 
 Poverty is also associated with other obstacles to normal development. For 
example, studies fi nd that lower income mothers report higher rates of  maternal 
 depression than do their higher income peers. A depressed individual is less likely 
to provide the attention and nurturing that are important to an infant thriving. 
Moreover, in comparison to children born to more affl uent families, children grow-
ing up in poorer homes are more likely to be exposed to tobacco smoke and have 
higher blood levels of lead (Aizer and Currie  2014 ; Coley and Baker  2013 , p. 19). 
 Many toddlers receive care outside of their own home, either in another home (a 
relative’s or other) or in a center (e.g., early learning centers, nursery schools, and 
preschools). Among children around 4 years old receiving nonparental day care, 
poor ones were much more likely to receive low-quality care than nonpoor were 
(Coley and Baker  2013 , Table 8). Not surprisingly, family income is strongly asso-
ciated with the ability to make private expenditures on behalf of children. Data show 
that, in 2005–2006, parents in the highest income quintile invested nearly $8900 in 
children’s enrichment, while those in the lowest quintile invested slightly more than 
$1,300, a ratio of 6.8. By comparison, in the years 1972–1973, the ratio was only 
4.2 (Duncan and Murnane  2011 , Fig. 1.6; see also Kaushal, Magnuson, and 
Waldfogel  2011 ). 
 As noted earlier, the gates to different opportunities tend to be open or closed in 
tandem. A child born to a young, single mother is more likely to grow up in poverty 
than one born to parents in a committed, stable relationship. The former is also more 
likely to live in a stressful environment, less likely to have positive extra-home 
experiences, such as visits to museums or exhibitions, and to receive benefi cial con-
tributions from extended family. It is repeatedly encountering closed gates (or, in 
other terms, multiple risk factors) that places many children at great disadvantage in 
their early years and beyond. 
 Thus, children born to families in different circumstances tend to develop along 
very different trajectories. Differences in cognitive skills, which are examples of 
what we here refer to as gaps, appear early on—as early as can be measured (Halle 
5 The Dynamics of Opportunity in America: A Working Framework
152
et al.  2009 , 87–119; for an international perspective, see Bradbury et al.  2013 ). By 
the time children enroll in kindergarten, differences in readiness are striking. These 
results are consistent with the well-known fi ndings of very large differences in 
vocabulary among kindergarten children from different SES strata (Hart and Risley 
 1995 ). 
 Clearly, the variation in  environmental factors documented above is an important 
contributor. Direct parental investment in children’s cognitive development also 
plays a role. Survey data reveal large differences by SES quintile. The percentage of 
kindergarteners whose parents read to them every day ranges from 62 % in the high-
est quintile to 36 % in the lowest. As one might expect, even within quintiles, there 
are noteworthy differences by race/ethnicity (Coley and Baker  2013 ). 
 Beginning School 
 The same conditions that are conducive to development from birth to age 5 are 
important for further development in the elementary grades. To the extent that fam-
ily circumstances remain reasonably stable, the pattern of gates open or closed at 
birth is typically replicated at age 5—unless (usually) public interventions are suc-
cessful in opening those gates that are closed. 23 
 Children with more accumulated human capital tend also to have more gates 
open to new opportunities, such as attending schools that are of higher quality (with 
respect to such features as teaching staff, safety, and physical plant), more parental 
involvement in schooling, more extracurricular experiences, and benefi ting from 
good nutrition and adequate medical/dental care. Children with lesser amounts of 
accumulated human capital are more likely to attend lower quality schools with 
fewer extracurricular activities. They are also more likely to suffer from health 
problems (e.g., asthma) and medical/dental problems that result in increased school 
absences and less engagement when in school. 
 Children starting behind in K-1 have diffi culty catching up. Many are not  reading 
on grade level by the end of grade 3—they are still “learning to read” rather than 
“reading to learn.” Studies show that students who enter kindergarten with little to 
no text comprehension skills are far behind peers with average or high text compre-
hension skills, and this gap continues to widen through third grade. A similar trend 
is found in  mathematics —a child entering kindergarten who does poorly in basic 
numbers skills will only fall further and further behind peers by third grade (Foster 
and Miller  2007 ; Bodovski and Farkas  2007 ). 
 Of course, an important mission of schools is to close the gaps that are evident 
on the fi rst day of class. But the schools attended by poor children—many if not 
most of whom are on the wrong side of the gap—are often ill-equipped to do so. 
Teachers in these schools are more likely to have fewer years of experience and less 
likely to have the requisite qualifi cations than teachers in schools serving more 
23 A discussion of such interventions is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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affl uent students. Moreover, those schools experience greater instability, with 
respect to both staff and students, so that there are fewer opportunities for students 
to receive coherent, systematic instruction. 
 Of course, peer interactions are an important component of schooling. In parallel 
with increased residential segregation, over the past two decades schools have 
become more segregated both by income and by race/ethnicity. As commentators 
have noted, “While the average White student attends a school where poor students 
account for a quarter to a third of enrollment, the typical Black or Hispanic student 
attends a school where nearly two-thirds of their peers are low-income” (Orfi eld 
et al.  2012 , quoted in Coley and Baker  2013 , p. 25). They also point out that “38 and 
43 % of Black and Hispanic students, respectively, attended schools where 90–100 % 
of students were minorities.” 
 As poor and minority students make their way through school, they are more 
likely to experience  suspensions , be required to repeat a grade and, eventually, drop 
out before completing high school. In 2009, students from the lowest family income 
quintile were about fi ve times more likely to  drop out than students from the highest 
quintile were. 24 Thus, by late adolescence or early adulthood, the gaps in cognitive 
skills are substantial and likely the result of the interaction of earlier gaps and cur-
rent school quality. Presumably, this is one of the mechanisms by which later gaps 
are still strongly associated with family background. 
 Another kind of gap relates to fl exibility and resilience. Those who have had the 
benefi t of open gates—and have taken advantage of the opportunities offered 
them—fi nd themselves on the right side of the gaps related to fl exibility (cognitive 
skills, maturity, etc.) in adapting to new circumstances or demands. They also have 
the capacity to recover from setbacks. As an example, poor students who enroll in 
postsecondary programs are more likely to accumulate  college debts that are large 
in relation to family income and to carry that debt for a long time, particularly if 
they leave without a degree or a marketable certifi cate. As a consequence, they will 
lack the fl exibility to respond to job opportunities that require moving and incurring 
further expenses. On the other hand, students from more advantaged backgrounds 
are less likely to accumulate substantial debt, more likely to graduate, and are able 
to call on family resources to take advantage of opportunities, such as unpaid intern-
ships, that demand further expenditures. 25 
24  For suspensions, see report of U.S. Department of Education  2014 ; For dropouts, see SES 
Indicator, “Poverty and High School Dropouts,” blog entry by Russell W. Rumberger, American 
Psychological Association, May 2013,  http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/indicator/2013/05/
poverty-dropouts.aspx , and references therein. See also Kearney and Levine ( 2014 ). 
25  Suzanne Mettler, “College, the Great Unleveler,”  New York Times , March 1, 2014. For a some-
what different view of college debt, see Chingos  2014 . 
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 Gradients 
 As noted earlier, the term “gradients” denotes the relationships between accumu-
lated human capital and outcomes in adulthood. One oft-cited example is the rela-
tionship between  unemployment and  educational attainment . During the period 
from January 2013 to August 2014, the unemployment rate for high school dropouts 
with no GED stood at 13.9 %, with the rates decreasing with increasing levels of 
educational attainment; for those with master’s degrees or higher, the rate was only 
2.9 % (see Chap.  7 , Fig.  7.2 ). Unfortunately, the problem is far worse than fi rst 
appears. As some labor economists argue, one must also take into account underem-
ployment and hidden unemployment. 26 They defi ne the labor underutilization rate 
as the sum of the unemployment, underemployment, and hidden unemployment 
rates. Figure  5.6 shows the labor underutilization rates as a function of educational 
attainment. The rates range from nearly 30 % for those with no high school diploma 
and no GED to 6.5 % for those with a master’s degree or above (see Khatiwada and 
Sum, Chap.  7 , Fig.  7.12 ). Even among those with full-time employment, there is a 
26  Underemployment refers to individuals who are working fewer hours than they desire. Hidden 
unemployment refers to individuals who are jobless and not actively seeking work, but indicated 
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 Fig. 5.6  Underutilization rates among U.S. workers (16 and over) by educational attainment, 




steep gradient in weekly earnings with respect to educational attainment. In 2009, 
the ratio in weekly earnings for individuals (aged 25 or more) with a bachelor’s 
degree was 1.64 relative to those with a high school diploma and 2.26 relative to 
high school dropouts. The ratios were quite similar for comparisons both among 
men and among women. 27 
 There are similarly steep gradients on social outcomes, broadly conceived. For 
example, in 2009, the percentage of mothers who were never married ranged from 
20.1 % for those with less than 12 years of education to only 3.3 % for those with 
18 or more years of education. 28 Not surprisingly, in 2010, the percentage of births 
to unmarried women stood at nearly 50 % for those with lower education and at 
10 % for those with higher education (Ibid.). These differences by education level 
have widened substantially over the last three decades. 
 There is considerable evidence that workplace-related gradients have been get-
ting steeper over time as well. As Table  5.2 shows, from 2000 to 2012–2013, the 
unemployment rate rose for all levels of educational attainment, but the percentage 
point increase was greater for those with lower educational attainment. 29 
Concomitantly, Table  5.3 shows that for individuals with full-time employment, 
those with lower educational attainment lost ground absolutely (in infl ation-adjusted 
dollars) from 1979 to 2009; only those with bachelor’s degrees or higher gained 
ground (Chap.  7 ). Consequently, wage ratios increased substantially over the period. 
For example, the ratio for those holding a bachelor’s degree to those holding a high 
school diploma went from 1.32 to 1.64, an increase of almost 25 %.
 These patterns appear to be the result of a confl uence of several forces and trends. 
Over the last two decades, technology has enabled many jobs to be off-shored, made 
obsolete, or changed them so dramatically that many fewer workers with different 
27 Andrew Sum, personal communication, May 2, 2014. 
28  Timothy Smeeding, “Connecting Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility: Looking Ahead, Not 
Behind” (unpublished PowerPoint presentation. Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty, 
2014). 
29  Current Population Survey monthly household surveys [public use fi les  2000 and January 
2012-August 2013]. Data compiled by the Center for Labor Market Studies, Northeastern 
University. 
 Table 5.2  Comparisons of the unemployment rates of U.S. adults 16 and older by educational 
attainment, 2000 and 2012–2013 (in %) (Sum presentation 2014) 
 Educational Attainment 
 (A)  (B)  (C) 
 2000  2012–2013  Percentage point change 
 <12 or 12, no diploma or GED  8.6  14.9  +6.3 
 H.S. diploma or GED  4.4  9.8  +5.4 
 13–15 years, no degree  3.5  8.4  +4.9 
 Associate’s degree  2.4  6.2  +3.8 
 Bachelor’s degree  2.0  4.7  +2.7 
 Master’s or higher degree  1.4  3.3  +1.9 
 All (16+)  4.0  8.0  +4.0 
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skills are required, as is the case with advanced manufacturing. 30 Some economists 
argue that technology, in various forms, leads to a “winner take all” economy that 
produces greater inequality. 31 The combination of technology, globalization, and the 
broad deregulation of industry that began in the 1980s, with the specter of  off- 
shoring in the background, has exerted a downward pressure on wages in the many 
sectors that are now characterized by both fewer jobs and more job seekers. The 
decline of private sector  unions , along with differences between states in “right to 
work” laws, has reduced the bargaining power of local workforces. While the 
decline of the buying power of the minimum wage contributes to the decline of 
those at the low end of the skill distribution, there is generally an upward pressure 
on wages for those who possess specialized skills that are scarce and in demand. 
The driver of this divergence is sometimes referred to as “skill-biased technological 
change.” 
 More ominously, the “second  IT revolution ” will feature even faster computers 
with more powerful forms of artifi cial intelligence that will automate, partially or 
fully, many jobs that are now considered to be more skilled (Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee  2014 , 34–37). Even today the new workplace rewards high-level cognitive 
skills, fl exibility, and the capacity to continuously upgrade skills as job require-
ments change (Levy and Murnane  2013 ). Moreover, individuals who have found a 
good place in the new economy are more likely to be offered training and educa-
tional opportunities that enable them to keep pace with workplace changes. Those 
who are in low-wage, low-skill occupations rarely have such opportunities and face 
many obstacles in trying to obtain new skills on their own (e.g., through enrollment 
in a community college or vocational training center). 
30  Goldin and Katz  2008 . 
31 Alan Krueger, “Land of Hope and Dreams: Rock and Roll, Economics, and Rebuilding the 
Middle Class” (remarks, Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, Cleveland, June 12, 2013). 
 Table 5.3  Wages for full-time employment by educational attainment, 1979–2009 (Sum 
presentation 2014) 
 Educational attainment 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
 1979  2009 
 Absolute change, 
1979–2009 
 Percent change, 
1979–2009 
 High school dropouts  696  500  −196  −28 % 
 High school graduates  869  716  −153  −18 % 
 Some college, including 
associate degree 
 942  835  −107  −11 % 
 Bachelor’s degree  1086  1200  +114  +10 % 
 Master’s or higher degree  1170  1535  +365  +31 % 
 H.S. graduate/H.S. dropout  1.25  1.43  +.18 
 Some college/H.S. graduates  1.08  1.17  +.09 
 B.A. degrees/H.S. graduates  1.25  1.68  +.43 
 Master’s or higher/H.S. 
graduates 
 1.35  2.14  +.79 
H. Braun
157
 Why Is Expanding Opportunity Important? 
 Employing the gates/gaps/gradients framework helps us understand how initial dif-
ferences in opportunity can be magnifi ed over time, resulting in wide disparities in 
accumulated human capital and increasing inequality in life outcomes that, in turn, 
contribute to greater differences in opportunity in the next generation. This cycle 
leads to what might be termed an  accelerated accumulation of advantage (or 
 disadvantage ). 32 An America that offers opportunity to all, we noted at the outset, 
has been an enduring belief and contributed to the strength of this country—in part 
by drawing  immigrants from all over the world searching for a better life for them-
selves and for their children. That this was never the case for everyone, and that it 
may be less true today than many imagine, in no way diminishes its importance and 
the obligation to promote its resurgence. 
 That obligation has many facets. It is a moral obligation, particularly to the chil-
dren born to disadvantage who, nonetheless, deserve a decent chance to realize their 
potential. Denying them that opportunity is not just a betrayal of America’s promise 
but does a disservice to us all—in greater social costs and lower overall economic 
growth (Stiglitz  2012 ). 33 In fact, there is good empirical evidence that greater 
inequality and the concomitant disparities in opportunity are associated with poorer 
health and less general satisfaction for everyone, even those on the top rungs of the 
ladder (Wilkinson and Pickett  2010 ; Sanger-Katz  2015 ). 
 There is some debate about whether increasing inequality portends lower  inter-
generational mobility (IGM) (Winship and Schneider  2014 ; Jerrim and Macmillan 
 2014 ). Although cross-nationally there is a strong association between greater 
income inequality and lower IGM, it is less clear whether that pattern holds within 
a country over time. Recent research suggests that in the U.S., IGM has remained 
steady, though at rather low levels. IGM appears to be particularly low at the 
extremes of the income distribution (Chetty et al.  2014a ; Corak  2013 ). However, it 
will take another 15–20 years for the impact of the recession of 2007–2010 on IGM 
to fully play itself out. 
 Irrespective of its consequences for IGM, the increasing separation between 
rungs of the  income ladder has immediate implications for the lives of all. On the 
one hand, many goods, such as televisions and cell phones, have become both 
cheaper and better. Indeed, some argue that, from an historical perspective, the per-
centage of the population that is poor has decreased markedly (Jencks  2015 ). On the 
other hand, individuals and families at the low end are spending a greater proportion 
32  For a comprehensive review of cumulative advantage, see DiPrete and Eirich  2006 . 
33  See interview with Christopher Jencks for a different view. Eduardo Porter, “Income Equality: A 
Search for Consequences,”  New York Times, March 25, 2014,  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/
business/economy/making-sense-of-income-inequality.html . Also see interview with Lane 
Kenworthy. Eduardo Porter, “Q&A: A Sociologist on Inequality,”  New York Times , March 25, 
2014.  http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/qa-a-sociologist-on-inequality/ . 
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of their disposal income on such necessities as food, rent, utilities, and transporta-
tion that relate directly to their ability to invest in themselves and their children. 34 
 We appear to be moving from a market economy to a market society, where 
everything has a price. When this extends beyond goods and services to social prac-
tices, it changes social relations and the meanings we attach to those relations 
(Sandel  2012 ). More prosaically, but no less importantly, this can be seen in the role 
of money in political campaigns. With the recent  Supreme Court decisions striking 
down campaign fi nance restrictions, the infl uence of wealthy contributors to politi-
cal campaigns will only grow. 
 Increasing inequality, in conjunction with other trends and developments, helps 
to shape civil society and the democratic polity. As we become more segregated by 
income and education, we typically have less empathy for those with whom we have 
little contact (Friedman  2005 ). Such  polarization necessarily undermines the notion 
of a shared future. When and if a large proportion of the population loses faith in the 
fairness of the social order and the extant political arrangements, then the stability 
that depends on the “consent of the governed” is threatened. Unfortunately, there is 
good evidence that differences in opportunity continue to increase over time and 
that many people have become disengaged from both civil society and the political 
process (Murray  2012 ). Looking ahead to the next generation, Putnam ( 2015 ) 
argues that, among high school students and young adults, there is an increasing 
divergence in this respect between those at the high end of the socioeconomic scale 
and those at the low end. 
 Moving Forward 
 The critical question is whether the dynamics of increasing divergence in opportuni-
ties and in life outcomes are self-correcting or self-reinforcing. More simply, was 
the pattern of shared prosperity seen in the three decades following World War II an 
anomaly? 
 Employing a vast trove of historical data, the French economist  Thomas Piketty 
argues that increasing inequality in wealth is the inexorable outcome of a market 
economy in which, over the long run, the returns to capital outpace the returns to 
labor and, consequently, result in the increasing concentration of wealth and politi-
cal power. This trend, he avers, can only be held in check by government action. 
Such actions should include a  global wealth tax as well as greater investments in 
education and training (Piketty  2014 ). 
34  Planet Money (NPR blog), “How the Poor, the Middle Class and the Rich Spend Their 
Money,” blog entry by Jacob Goldstein, August 1, 2012,  http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/
2012/08/01/157664524/how-the-poor-the-middle-class-and-the-rich-spend-their-money ; Real Time 
Economics ( Wall Street Journal blog), “How Rich and Poor Spend (and Earn) Their Money,” 




 His diagnosis is supported by the economist  Alan Krueger , who decries the “ero-
sion of the institutions and practices that supported shared prosperity.” He argues 
that private industry has to take the lead in righting this balance and government’s 
responsibility is to set the conditions for that recommitment to the common good. 
This seems a bit weak—and he does end with a list of more forceful interventions, 
including an increase in the minimum wage, fi nancial reform, income tax reform, 
and greater infrastructure investment. 35 
 To be sure, some economists argue that this phenomenon is a natural outgrowth 
of human variation: Starting with a perfectly equal society, individual differences in 
talent, energy, and motivation, as well as random shocks, would inexorably lead to 
an unequal society; moreover, this inequality, however extreme, does not signal 
unfairness or ineffi ciency (Mankiw  2013 ). This view leads to a recommendation of 
minimal policy interventions. Stiglitz, who is quoted at the outset of this chapter, 
takes a less benign view: He sees increasing inequality as a signal of market ineffi -
ciencies, such as rent-seeking (trying to obtain economic gain without any recipro-
cal benefi t to society), and argues that those with greater resources are in an ever 
better position to infl uence laws and regulations to preserve and strengthen these 
advantages, for their benefi t, their families, and associates (Stiglitz  2012 ). 
 If one adopts the less sanguine view, then there are certainly formidable barriers 
to countering the self-reinforcing dynamics of inequality of opportunity. A polar-
ized central government is unlikely to take bold action, especially in light of the 
unavoidable uncertainties involved in projecting current trends into the future. (This 
situation is much like the one confronting those who argue for strong action on cli-
mate change.) Indeed, budget plans from the House of Representatives prescribe 
scaling back some of the supports now provided to the poor. Yet at the same time, 
the  Affordable Care Act acts to extend medical insurance to millions of individuals 
who have done without, although efforts continue to derail or scale it back. 
 One can certainly hope that some segments of private industry will take the lead. 
Here there is certainly a mixed picture. On the one hand, the fi nance industry spends 
millions on protecting such benefi ts as the “carried interest” provision in the tax 
code or on weakening the  fi nancial regulations spurred by the  Dodd-Frank Act . 36 
For the most part, large retailers and fast food chains are resisting an increase in the 
minimum wage, even though its real purchasing power has plummeted since it was 
last raised. 37 
 On the other hand, there is some evidence that a few corporations are taking a 
broader view of their responsibilities—not only to their shareholders and customers 
but also to their employees, the communities in which they are located, and even to 
35  Krueger, “Land of Hope.” 
36  Paul Krugman, “Obama’s Other Success,”  New York Times, August 4, 2014,  http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/04opinion/paul-krugman-dodd-frank-fi nancial-reform-is-working.html/ . 
37  On February 19, 2015, Doug McMillon, Walmart President and CEO, announced a program of 
increases in the minimum wage for current and new associates, as well as for department manag-
ers. About a month later, McDonald’s followed suit with a wage increase for employees in its 
corporate-run stores. 
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society at large. That broader view goes beyond the traditional “bottom line” to 
consideration of community stability and environmental stewardship (Googins, 
Mirvis, and Rochlin  2007 ; Freeland presentation to  Opportunity in America panel 
2014). At present it is hard to determine whether this movement toward  sustainable 
capitalism will prove to be long lasting and whether it will have any effect on the 
dynamics of inequality. 
 In the search for viable policies and the strategies to build consensus around 
them, it is necessary to consider some further complications. For example, the fam-
ily circumstances that play such a critical role in the access to opportunity are not 
just determined by the impersonal forces we have been discussing. They are also a 
product of individual choices, sometimes poor ones. To what extent can and should 
government intervene, at least on behalf of children, to compensate for those 
choices, for insuffi cient private investment in the children, or even parental neglect? 
There can be reasoned disagreement on government’s responsibility. 
 At the same time there is considerable evidence that early interventions, say 
between birth and age 3, if effective, can yield benefi t-to-cost ratios substantially 
above 1 and considerably greater than those for later interventions can. Moreover, it 
appears that those early interventions can enhance the effects of later interventions 
in a virtuous cycle (particularly if they target both cognitive and noncognitive skills) 
with important implications for later labor market success (Heckman,  Case for 
Investing ). 38 
 Another complication arises because the distribution of opportunity is “lumpy”—
it varies substantially by location, as well as by demographic characteristics such as 
race-ethnicity, immigration status, prison record, and so on. Presumably, the con-
junction of these factors can either mitigate or exacerbate access to opportunity. For 
example, recent data indicate that other things being equal, Blacks are more likely 
to have lost ground in the distributions of income and wealth during the recession 
(for a general discussion of race in America, see Orfi eld  2014 ). 
 Over the last decade, certain areas have become hubs of the new economy with 
a high concentration of well-paying jobs, while others stagnate or decline. For the 
former, there are spillover effects, so that even those further down the skills ladder 
derive some benefi t from being located in those areas (Acs  2013 ; Moretti  2013 ). 
Although intergenerational mobility may well be stable (or stagnant) overall, it var-
ies very substantially by location. For example, recent work shows that, roughly 
speaking, for children growing up in below-median income families, upward mobil-
ity is highest in the Midwest, lowest in the Southeast, and moderate at the coasts 
(Chetty  2014b ). 
 Thus, it appears that a viable policy strategy will have to comprise multiple ini-
tiatives at various governmental levels, with serious attempts to bring the resources 
of both the for-profi t and nonprofi t sectors to bear on the problem. Although the 
dynamics underlying the current situation are complex, they are not beyond under-
38 As results from the Brookings Institution Social Genome Project make clear, real impact on 




standing or mitigation. As one commentator put it: “Rising inequality is a trend, but 
it is one we have helped create and one we can still change.” 39 
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